INTRODUCTION
During the last decade populism has once again come to the center of the political scene in Latin America. It is expressed in two different ways. The first, is the traditional style expressed by the government, as in Venezuela with president Hugo Chávez. The second way has origin in mobilization of the population where might be a "latent populism" which could become evident when this population reach power. Two examples of this type of populism are the cases of "Piqueteros" in Argentina and "Cocaleros" in Bolivia When we talk about populism we are faced with a very "ambiguous concept" which can be wide and inclusive 2 .
It depends on what we want to emphasize. Then, from the point of view of the economy of a country-which is the subject of this article-populism males emphasis on the growth by short term public policies of redistribution in order to growth the consumption. These impact the macroeconomics equilibrium, especially inflation and fiscal deficit. In this case we talk about macroeconomic populism 3 .
There are some cases where the classic populism regime can apply economic decisions which benefit some people. There is a kind of "distributive microeconomic" which can be compatible with a "stable macroeconomic". It could be the case of Menem in Argentina or Fujimori in Perú 4 . But macroeconomic populism is not a new situation; it has been applied in Latin America in different periods 5 . Macroeconomic populism uses fiscal, monetary and credit expansive policies and strong valuation of the currency in order to accelerate the growth of the economic and redistribute the income. These policies applied without fiscal and monetary restrictions and the result is high inflation and economic crises as has occurred in the next cases we are going to analyze in this article (Argentina, Chile and Peru). These cases prove that the populism is the cause of . Colombia, curiously some years ago was the exception to this rule.
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
The term populism was originally used in the United States in the mid-1890s, referring to the People's Party, but since almost no movement or leader has acknowledged being "populist." In current political language, the term has a negative connotation, being closely associated with terms like "demagogia", economic bounty, which indicate economic or political irresponsibility 7 .
Populism is a controversial concept, and agreements about what it means and who qualifies as a populist is difficult because politicians don't want to identify with this analytical category 8 .
With the economic crisis of the late twentieth century, characterized by external shocks, among which are included the effects of the Asian crisis and the Swiss bankruptcy 9 , the dynamism that characterized the economies of Latin America in the early years of the nineties (except for Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay in 1995) led to a stalemate. This period was called the "five years lost" by ECLAC.
Therefore, it rediscovered the importance of institutions as an essential framework for the proper functioning of markets 10 . Above, it said to be the reason for the failure of the Washington consensus led to discussion on the idea of a shift to the left in Latin America. Ibídem. 9 Paramio, Ludolf. "Left turn and the return of populism". In: Revista Nueva Sociedad. No. 205. p. 65 10 Ibíd. p. 66. However, there was a divergence between political discourse, the position on globalization and the interpretation of democratic reforms and the role of institutions 11 . The only coincidence is the emphasis on social policy and the pursuit of a focused economic model, not only in growth, but social outcomes, which has slowly degenerated into populism.
METHODOLOGY
For this article, there will be a comparative exercise of economic policy management, fiscal and monetary policy by the various governments in Latin America in order to identify the use of economic tools for populist purposes. The selection of countries is done arbitrarily and corresponds to the accessibility of information on economic variables on the behavior of fiscal and monetary policy. Similarly, we use simple graphic variables such as inflation, unemployment, gross domestic product, credit, etc, when available and at different times depending on the country for analysis.
The idea is to study at the end the Colombian case and draw lessons that allow us to explain, first, the dangers of macroeconomic populism; second, the relative economic stability experienced by Colombia in recent decades, in relation to neighboring countries. After the experience of the European countries, economists discussed different theories about the characteristics and effects of traditional hyperinflation and the effective policies which where applied but resulted in being very expensive for the society. Some years later some Latin -America countries were in the same situation as Europe had been, but the same policies did not function because they were applied in a very different context 14 .
The origin of traditional European hyperinflation obeyed to external factors. After the First World War, the European economies presented high budgets deficits which where financed by means of the creation of currency. In order to stop the hyperinflation, there was realized an orthodox program or global plan of stabilization, which generated credibility with the public and certainty that the Central Bank would not finance the budget deficit by issuing currency.
The
European countries that faced hyperinflation, the incomes only covered a small fraction of the total expenses of the country and the collapse in the public incomes coincided with the increase of inflation (Olivera Tanzi Effect) 15 . In addition, the hyperinflation phenomenon was preceded by an excessive 12 DOORNBUSH, Rudiger. The Macroeconomics of Populism. Ob. Cit.
13
Ibíd.
14 KRUGMAN, Paul. Economía Política internacional. Mac Graw Hill. 1997. 15 Ibíd. level inflation tax (seignior age]). Undoubtedly, the key components of the integral programs of orthodox policies were:
• The policies of stabilization that were adopted.
• The exchange rate which restored the convertibility of the domestic currency in terms of the dollar or of the gold and the reduction of the budget deficit.
The credibility of the Central Bank is in the public eye when it promised to reject the demands of the internal unsecured credits and not to grant any mores internal credit to the government 16 .
Classical Populism as a Cause of Hyperinflation and Macroeconomic Instability in Latin America
Hyperinflation in Latin America, with the exception of the Bolivian hyperinflation, -which presented traditional characteristics-, occurred in a very particular context. Moreover, in each country the new antiinflationary programs coincided with the end of a government and the beginning of another. For this reason it is a new opportunity for macroeconomic populism to promise at the same time to reduce unemployment and to control inflation. As we know -"Phillips's Curve" teaches that it is not possible to achieve both aims in the short term
19
. This is an example of application of the Theory of the "Economic -Political Cycle" which shows how the government does everything necessary to grow and to increase employment and the production of the country in the short term by means of increasing public spending, the external debt and the fiscal deficit 20 . These policies cause hyperinflations which could be handling by orthodox or heterodox policies which it will apply, on having finished its electoral period, or will remained a problem 18 DOORNBUSH, Rudiger. to resolve for the following government. This is an example of the macroeconomic populism as an important cause the big hyperinflations and of the macroeconomic instability in Latin America.
Phases of Macroeconomic Populism
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Rudiger Dornbusch says a populism policy progresses through these phases: (Chart N. 1) 21 Then we are going to study each of the proposed cases.
RESULTS
Cases of Macroeconomic Populism
In populism. Perón tried to solve the problems of income inequality, through price controls and expansionary policies in state spending. These were financed through the inorganic issuance, which generated a problem of inflation that would remain in Argentina for over thirty years Also Perón nationalized many businesses, passed legislation that favored labor unions and used public funds for the work benefactors of the Foundation Eva Perón, led by his wife. Peron was deposed in 1955 and exiled during 18 years until 1973, and his party, the Justicialista Party, was forbidden to participate in the electoral process 24 .
After a tumultuous period in which democratic governments alternated, Peron was re-elected and he took power in October 1973. He died in July of the following year. His second wife while vice president, María Estela "Isabel" Martínez de Perón, succeeded him. Perón's second government again used price controls and increased government spending as their tools of social policy, as had happened almost twenty years before as a result of unbalanced economy.
In 1976 In 1983, inflation edged the 430% and assumed power after free elections, Raúl Alfonsin, he belonged to Radical Civic Union (UCR), the Peronist opposition party. The main problem for the government was to fight inflation and ran the Austral Plan, which required an austere fiscal and monetary performance, plus a tax reform to improve the financing of expenditure. The plan ordered the freezing of prices and utility rates and the regulation of interest rates and the exchange rates. After a year of implementation, the monetary policy and price controls were relaxed. The latter attempt to control inflation was the Spring Plan, which was also unsuccessful: inflation marked a record 4923% in 1989 26 .
In this situation of economic chaos, Carlos Saúl Menem, took over the government in 1989. He was the Peronist and former governor of La Rioja. His Peronist tradition was not in favor of a heterodox shock policies needed to combat inflation and he spent a year without a fixed course. In 1990 inflation reached 1343% and the economy had remained stagnant from two decades ago, as the average annual growth during that period was less than 1% 27 . These facts forced the Argentine government to take drastic measures: after nearly twenty years of inflation, it was thought that the only way to give confidence to staff was through the "Austral Convertibility", in relation to 1-1 of Argentina currency against the U.S. dollar. The only inflation in the economy would be imported from the United States.
The plan achieved the goal of ending inflation. In 1992, it was only 17% in 1993 was 7.4%, after 3.9% in 1994, and every year after that was below 2% until 2002 28 . However, a system of fixed exchange rate brought some economic Additionally, since amount of resources issued depended only on the flow of dollars, the country's capital outflow caused interest rates to rise. This mechanism should again attract capital, but in the contexts of Tequila and the Russian crisis (Paramio), they turned away from emerging markets fearing a repetition of similar scenarios in other countries. These last two required immediate treatment, but the government sought reelection and did not allow it. Once again the populist strategies of the leaders are used to keep them in power.
Added to this was the lack of flexibility in domestic prices. The syndicalist tradition and a strong regulated labor market hampered the flexibility of wages to adjust the delay in competitiveness (real wages increased by 42% between 1990 and 1998).
But the biggest problem for the economy was Argentina's external debt, correlated with the maintenance of a high fiscal deficit throughout the nineties and the early years of the new millennium. In 2001 the debt approached 150 billion U.S. dollars. This figure corresponded to nearly 50% of its GDP 30 .
In 1999 the problem of convertibility needed to be resolved. become more expensive. President Menem chose not to devalue, perhaps with the illusory hope of getting re-elected a second time.
In late 1999, the government of Fernando de la Rúa (UCR-Alliance Frepaso) started. This government opted to keep the convertible model, adjusting the fiscal situation and avoid new borrowing. It tried to give the necessary credibility to the government to encourage foreign capital in Argentina. The idea was to return this country by the path of growth.
After months of marches and counter marches, street protests, strikes, several letters of intent signed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and finally the straw that broke the camel´s back was the announcement of the withdrawal limit for bank deposits to $ 250 per week (corralito). Fernando de la Rúa was forced to resign 31 . After three interim presidents that lasted just a few days in to government comes, allowing it to Eduardo Duhalde, who finally devalues the peso float freely against the dollar, plunging the country into a serious crisis, but necessary measure to stabilize at levels close to 3 pesos dollar in late 2003. Again, during the governments of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina de Kirchner macroeconomic populism was evident, as it used to appear. Expansive growth policies endangered economic stability, to the point of hiding their effects through the manipulation of inflation.
Chile
Historically, Chile has been characterized as one of the countries of greater political stability and democratic development in Latin America. However, the antagonism of the political parties prevented the formation of a strong government and after six years of government failed to meet the expectations, of political and economic transformation generated in the population.
Therefore, in 1970, the Chilean people opted for the socialist candidate of Popular Unity (UP), Salvador Allende. This government was proclaimed anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic and antitrust. Its main objective was to strengthen the structural changes in the distribution of property. To achieve this should nationalize the means of production and encourage greater participation 38 . Its main reforms were the nationalization of the country's mineral resources, the nationalization of large industrial enterprises, nationalization of banks and the deepening of land reform. The first two years of the Pinochet government turned to control the macroeconomic imbalances left by Allende. In parallel, they established a market economic policy, a fairly pure neoliberal model, with a sui generis property in Latin America: total autonomy to implement the policies it wishes. It eliminated price controls, tariffs were lowered dramatically to encourage imports, financial markets were liberalized and international capital flows were restructured and reduced public sector spending. Land reform was reversed and they began an aggressive privatization process of public enterprises.
Chile suffered terribly both economically and socially after the debt crisis of 1982. However, in 1984 Chile began a phase of high economic growth which would largely reverse the ravages of the crisis of the early decade. In 1989, after losing the referendum to stay in power, Pinochet calls for free elections in March 1990 the "Government of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy" begins chaired by Patricio Aylwin of the Christian Democrats, who took the decision not to change the historical direction of economic policy and gave priority to reducing This strategy was consolidating long-term development and supported by the growth and diversification of exports, while reaffirming the importance of maintaining macroeconomic balance through fiscal austerity.
This approach was vital for generating a climate of institutional stability needed to generate private investment. This policy was followed by the governments of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tegla (1994 and Ricardo Lagos (2000 -2006) . During the nineties, Chile grew at an average rate of 7% annually. This prosperity was reflected in the improvement in real wages, increased employment levels and falling poverty and destitution. However, the export sector is not articulated with the national industry to produce value-added products, making the economy vulnerable to price changes. The high profitability in the export of primary products was discouraged in order to invest in the industrial sector, while maintaining low tariffs and competitive prices for imported goods. Under this system, the input of capital and profit repatriation is virtually unrestricted and state involvement and participation was minimal.
Between 1950 and 1962 the annual average fiscal deficit was -0.2% of GDP, inflation was 7.0% per year, GDP grew annually at a rate of 5.3% and foreign debt amounted to U.S. $ 158 million. However, the social situation was bad and was characterized by high concentration of income.
In 1962, more than 30 years after the start of the ISI in Argentina and Chile, the elected President Fernando Belaunde's Popular Action party, began to implement this model. In this period were applied policies such as tariff increase for finished goods, fixed exchange rate, price controls, increased government investment in infrastructure, increased public spending, increasing foreign debt (which is necessary because of a lack of foreign exchange generated by the exchange rate appreciation) and the process began with land reform. However, these reforms did not have political consensus, especially from export sector which was directly affected. As a result, the fiscal deficit continued to increase, which was covered by foreign debt, also intensified the process of agricultural reform, as farm ownership was highly concentrated. It is important to point out how. It was wrong for Perú land reform to be combined with the ISI, when much to these two incompatible policies dismantled the national productive apparatus. During the period 1975-1980 he attempted to reverse some of the measures of Velasco, but not the reform or nationalization private enterprises. On the one hand, the government encouraged non-traditional exports through successive devaluations of the currency (that generated inflation). The government tried, without success, repeated adjustments of the fiscal and external debt, but they continued to increase. This period benefited from a rise in export prices of metals.
In 1980, democracy returned to Perú and Fernando Belaunde, leader of Popular Action, was elected. He organized a co-government with the Popular Party's center-right Christian. The government applied a weird combination of liberal politics to commerce populist in the macroeconomic. He continued external borrowing, which conditioned the rhetoric of economic policy. Income inequality, inherent since the inception of the republic, had not been resolved. Thus, in the early eighties, subversive movements Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) were born and the government failed to articulate a coherent strategy to overcome in its infancy.
In 1985, Alan García was elected. He represented APRA, the oldest party in Perú. APRA was a socialist, anti-imperialist and revolutionary. This party decides to unilaterally declare a moratorium on foreign debt, a move that immediately isolated Perú from the international financial community.
García returned to the ISI and state intervention through expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Again applied price controls, increased tariffs on imports, prohibited a large number of commodities that could be manufactured in Perú. Alan García tried to control inflation by fixing the basic price of the economy (such as gasoline and light), as the state owned production companies).
During the implementation of populist model of Alan García, the economy grew by 12.1% in 1986 (due to expansionary fiscal and monetary policies By 1988, the fiscal deficit had reached 9.7% of GDP, while the product shrank by 9.4%. Alan Garcia never considered the possibility of pursuing a policy shock like orthodox prices. If the government had taken corrective measures in 1987, when inflation was only 1145%, it could have avoided three years of additional suffering for the people of Perú. By 1988, inflation had climbed to 1722% and for 1989 was 2775% 51 .
Phenomenon of terrorism continued to rise, transforming a rural phenomenon to become urban. The long queues for food, strikes, and terrorist violence led to the Peruvian people to seek an alternative to the traditional parties.
At first, that alternative Mario Vargas Llosa represented the Libertad Movement, which is allied with the Popular Christian Party Acción Popular, two traditional parties which join to form the Frente Democrático (FREDEMO). Vargas Llosa government pursued a policy of "redistribution freezing" by decree the prices of essential nutrients. When prices were devalued traders kept the food and black markets emerged.
In 1990, the country welcomes Alberto Fujimori as a new President of the Republic. He decided to pursue a policy of shock, as the only sensible measure. First, the prices rose dramatically to their estimated real level and were then released from government control.
At the same time, Fujimory applied a tight monetary policy, issuing only the essentials. The policy worked, as inflation went from a disastrous 7649% within 1990 to 139% during 1991. In 1994, inflation was only 15%, and since 1997, Perú has had single digit inflation Peruvian economy into a market economy. It began an intensive process of privatization, which favored an accumulated economic growth of 43% in the first seven years, the government decided to liberalize the trade and foreign capital investment and more flexible industrial relations.
After the coup d´état of 1992, Abimael Guzmán, Shining Path leader was captured, and in 1993 Perú promulgated a new Constitution which allowed presidential reelection. Fujimori was re-elected, was to become a progressively authoritarian and corrupt leader. His third term lasted only three months because he had to flee to Japan, after the scandal of the first video of Montesinos's corruption network. (2001) (2002) (2003) . Available on: http://www. gestiopolis.com/canales5/eco/consorcio/eys52/ archivos/52-evolucion-economica-gobierno-toledoen-el-peru.pdf
In the last of the Fujimori administration, the fiscal deficit was above the 3% of GDP. The economic administration of President Toledo strengthened the control over public finances, thus reducing the fiscal deficit to 2.5% of GDP in 2001, for which it including launched a package of tax policies and administration, increasing the rate of general sales tax. In the same period the public debt as a percentage of GDP fell from 46.1% to 38.0% 55 .
The government of Alan García implemented expansionary fiscal and monetary policies that explain the strong growth of domestic demand in 2007. Increased demand led to an economic expansion and rice in imports. This generated a trade deficit and an increase in inflation and financial vulnerability of the economy and loss of credibility for the Central Bank. García used policies that show an apparent expansionary economic growth which was not sustainable, and ended up weakening and loosening the Peruvian economy 56 .
Venezuela
In 1998, six years after realizing an unsuccessful rebellious attempt against Carlos Andrés Pérez, the colonel Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías was elected as President of Venezuela. Since then his presidency has been defined as populist due to the different measures that including the following: very strong critic of the government of United States, of globalization and the market economy. During these years, the president has nationalized foreign companies, he has named his supporters in the Supreme Court, and he has implemented several programs directed to attending to the health of population while attacking the illiteracy of the poorest population of the country Equally, he has changed the constitution to allow his perpetual reelection. Chávez defines himself as the standard-bearer of the "Bolivarian Revolution" 58 . Nevertheless, before Chávez, Venezuela had experienced already the characteristics of populism. The populist history of Venezuela, began in the middle of the eighties, in Jaime Lusinchi's Presidency, when the fiscal deficit, the foreign debt, and the inflation increased in a substantial way.
Between 1989 and 1993, the president Carlos Andrés Pérez tried to restore the economic order, to reduce the inflation, and to adopt modern measures but they were weak. When Pérez assumed power, the foreign debt was enormous and out of control, there was a shortage of food and credit had disappeared 59 . One of the measures of stronger shock implemented by Perez was a strong devaluation, which reduced the value of the bolivar by two thirds 60 . In three months, the price of the public transport increased thirty per cent.
As consequence of the multiple disturbances caused by the dissatisfaction of the population, this sad episode of the Venezuelan history was known as the caracazo 61 and resulted in the deaths of more than 300 people in less than 5 days 62 . Pérez, Though unsuccessful, Chávez was popular among the population, which then lead to the power. The Venezuelan people were convinced that corruption was the most serious problem facing the country and Chávez was seen at the time as a hero.
One of the major consequences of the
In 1993, Pérez was accused of corruption and removed from his post by the Congress. In 1994, Rafael Caldera, who had been President between 1969 and 1974 came to power thanks to a populist platform that was opposed to the reforms and to the globalization.
His administration undid most of the shy reforms implemented during the second period of Carlos Andrés Pérez, realized in the frame of the consensus of Washington. In the first two years of Caldera´s presidency, his administration was characterized by rapid inflation, control of prices, and fall of the bolivar, bank crises and economic stagnation.
In 1994 the government liberated Colonel Hugo Chávez from prison and signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In exchange for 1600 million dollars the government promised to reduce inflation and to reactivate growth, by a program of the modernization of the state and liberalization of the economy.
When Chávez assumed the power in 1998, Venezuela was the country of Latin America, which had implemented the least neoliberal reforms. For this reason is possible to affirm that Chávez is not a product of the Consensus of Washington. Chávez is a product of the corruption, the economic stagnation and the complacency of the Venezuelan elite The use of these social programs for political purposes, "that since the political theory called the patronage" 67 , have been considered a favorite tools of populist politicians 68 .
From 2002, public spending rose sharply and the central bank issued currency more easily. Accordingly, the official inflation rate was over 30%, there was a price control and commodities became scarce 69 .
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Despite these social policies, growth in Venezuela has not been particularly significant in relation to the rest of Latin American countries (3.5% on average between 1999 and 2007). In fact, some analysts attribute the entire Venezuelan economic growth in this period to the increase in oil prices and the control exerted on the government oil sector by the government 70 but not to the success of the social policies of the Chávez government.
4.2 Colombia: why there has not been macroeconomic populism in our country?
As we have seen the countries of Latin America went through this phase of populism, with disastrous effects for the economy and welfare of its inhabitants. We note how the countries have some economic and political memory, enabling them to learn from their mistakes. We should ask ourselves if the populist political knowledge is absolutely untenable, or whether it can succeed. Colombia has hadn´t absence a populist policy in the last four decades.
Colombia has been perhaps the exception to the rule of Latin American hyperinflation. In the last decades and until early 1990, Colombia has been characterized by macroeconomic stability, in contrast to the enormous volatility that other countries had in Latin America.
This stability without doubt is given by economic and political factors. On the one hand, economic stability generated by the coffee chains, led to unfavorable conditions for the emergence of populist movements.
Furthermore, the existence of a consolidated system of two political parties, contributed to an ideological convergence that has enabled the design and discussion of economic policies in a non-ideologically polarized. This independence of the Central Bank has encouraged the control of inflation, even at the expense of jobs and demand, and according to some of democracy itself.
Regarding the latter argument, it should be noted that the independence of central banks, driving away the temptation of populist as a tool as powerful as monetary policy, as submitted to the control of the Congress, academia, local financial markets and international public opinion.
In Colombia, during the government of Alvaro Uribe Vélez, the Democratic Security policy proposed by his government, resulted in feelings of security and confidence for the majority of Colombian citizens, increasing the president's popularity ratings.
However, in his management of economic policy, it is possible to observe some features of populism. With the aim of increasing the fighting forces, the Democratic Security Tax Similarly, and in order to obtain more resources major state enterprises were privatized 76 . Despite the announced austerity, the government increased its social spending programs such as investing in action families Familias en Acción, the expansion of subsidized health system, the new target population of the ICBF, breakfasts for children, protection for the elderly, increased training of the Sena, reducing unemployment, promoting microcredit, the impetus to housing for the poor and increasing social investment 77 , indicating that despite the high fiscal deficit, government spending continued to increase in military manpower and welfare policies without much impact on the welfare of society.
Unemployment had a small reduction from 2002 to 2007. However it increased from 2008 (see Chart 6). This increase may be associated with the effect of the global crisis on our country, taking into account the high degree of dependence of the Colombian economy on the U.S. economy.
During his first term of office, the Uribe government managed to maintain a certain economic stability to get through a fiscal policy strategy, which meant significant increases in public spending. However, during his second administration, this economic growth was affected by the revaluation and low employment generation. It is necessary to note that the early years coincided with the expansion of the global economy. However, in the efforts to achieve re-election and other political factors led the Uribe government to "leave aside" the economic issue. This led him to be less competitive in the second period. It is possible to conclude that some features of the phenomenon called macroeconomic populism were present during the administration of President Uribe. He made use of economic policy to develop programs that allowed him to have a good national image, especially with the most vulnerable population, thus hiding the poor economic performance and serious problems of corruption within their government.
However, Colombia did not experience, like other Latin American countries at the time, the terrible consequences of macroeconomic populism. The strength of the institutions to which the Constitution had assigned the management of economic and fiscal policy and the control to prevent to use these tools in an irresponsible way by the executive, coupled with the traditional central bank independence, explains this situation.
Of course, many other factors contributed to the economic stability of Colombia in the Latin American context. Among these factors are the coffee boom and the boom of drug trafficking. All of these factors led the Colombian economy to be of populist management. It never had hyperinflation, and the country experienced the greatest macroeconomic stability in Latin America in the last sixty years. The exception is that Belaunde and Velasco did twenty years after knowing that it had not worked in Peron's Argentina.
Velasquismo inspired socialist Allende and Allende inspired García, 12 years after learning that this model had failed in Chile. It is hard to understand the logic of repeating failed experiences in dogmatic convictions.
We should, in light of what has been studied in the five cases presented, reflect on some lessons that I think are important: The first lesson is the importance of having a good economy policy to allow a strong social policy. Improving the quality of life of people, it is almost impossible in a context of recession or negative growth.
The time needed to generate revenue and quality jobs in an economy is more than the speed with which these jobs are lost in times of crisis. That is, the impact of the crisis is always greater than the impact of the expansions. Therefore, generating a long-term sustained growth is a necessary but not enough to improve the quality of life of the population.
The second lesson is that one should not avoid a necessary and inevitable adjustment for political reasons, because if the adjustment is postponed, the treatment will end up being worse than the disease. Postponing the devaluation caused three years of additional suffering to the people of Argentina, and likewise for the Peruvians, who watched as little by little the quality of life was deteriorating.
Colombia is the exception to the rule of macroeconomic populism in Latin America. Different factors set out below (coffee stability, bipartisan consensus, macroeconomic policies, central bank independence, etc.) have never contributed to hyperinflation, and to maintained macroeconomic stability.
However, the absence of populism does not imply that there were always chosen to sound policies, at least on social issues on the poverty levels. In conclusion, macroeconomic populism was extremely harmful to the welfare of the countries studied and Colombia was the exception to the rule. 
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